Tragedy cuts into such a story deeply inasmuch as a founder, whether of a nation or a religion, ideally understood, cannot have personal interests interfere with his tasks. That is to say, the family and the community in which he dwells must remain an abstraction, separate from his concrete task. In a very tragic sense, therefore, Abraham loses the larger world. As Derrida would argue, "religion in the Abrahamic definition tends to resist true openness toward the other" (Borradori 155 ). Like Plato's philosopher-rulers, like Rousseau's legislator, these founders could not have a personal stake in their creations-the same is true for Abraham. Although eulogized and most deserving of its benefits (Machiavelli Ch. X) , none of these founders could participate in the community. Rather, the founder lives beside, absently present, anonymous, and unrecognizable, perhaps abiding as a "tax collector," as de silentio suggests, but never able to self-disclose, never being able to express the ethical, hence the human. On the one hand, one might say that within his faith Abraham lived authentically. Differentiating himself from his founder, Johannes de silentio characterizes Abraham and his faith in the following terms.
The dialectic of faith is the finest and the most extraordinary of all; it has an elevation of which I can certainly form a conception, but no more than that . . . I can walk upside down in existence, but I cannot make the next movement, for the marvellous I cannot do-I can only be amazed at it (Kierkegaard, Fear 36; SV 5, 35) .
On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that within his loss Abraham lived entirely inauthentically as an outsider and spectator. He controlled nothing; his relationship to God became the essential matrix of his life . His role demanded silence-therefore the loss. He could live with Sarah (who, however, died fairly soon afterwards), and, of course, with Isaac, but only in pain. He could tell them nothing, and within the community in which he dwelled, he could only observe, not participate. 4 He could not tell the truth: that he was ready to commit murder. He could not express his ethical task, as noted in "Problema I" of Fear and Trembling where de silentio asks with alarming calm, "If Abraham actually had sacrificed Isaac, would he therefore have been less justified?" (Kierkegaard, Fear 63: SV5, 59 ). Derrida suggests that Abraham was imprisoned in his singularity by his silence. Speaking relieves us, says Johannes de silentio, "for it translates into the general" (Kierkegaard, Fear 113; SV 5, 102) . Language interrupts singularity, involves it in the general in all its ethical and political dimensions, muddying its perspective and thereby depriving it of liberty and infinite responsibility. Within the context of the general, the infinite withdraws into the background, and has little if any voice. The scandal is that the silence of Abraham-the silence of singularity-renders him unaccountable with respect to others, and hence from an ethical perspective, Abraham is absolutely irresponsible-the aporia of responsibility (Derrida 60) . There, Johannes Climacus, another pseudonymous author, suggests that Fear and Trembling constituted a "rash" or "reckless" "anticipation."
In Fear and Trembling, a "knight of faith" such as this was portrayed. But this portrayal was only a rash [or "reckless"] anticipation, and the illusion [or perhaps "disappointment" (Skuffelse)] was gained by depicting him in a state of completeness (hence in a false medium) instead of in the existence-medium, and the beginning was made by ignoring the contradiction-how an observer [de silentio] could become at all aware (opmoerksom) of him [Abraham] in such a way that he could place himself, admiringly outside, and admire that there is nothing, nothing whatever, to notice (moerke), unless Johannes de silentio would say that the knight of faith is his own poetic production (Kierkegaard, Postscript 500; SV10 178 Works of Love-the true "existence-medium"-as the parallel or companion to Fear and Trembling, which is intended for the ordinary believer, the ordinary human being who is not a founder, but only, at best, a follower, at least from one S. Kierkegaard's perspective-another pseudonym perhaps. The significance of this beginning of the main part of Fear and Trembling, "Problema I," has often been read as a negative preface to real faith, as that which stands in the way of faith, and hence as detrimental to even the possibility of the leap that faith implies. In other words, the ethical is seen as an arbitrary hindrance to religion, to the acceptance of God's grace. But what happens if we read this beginning as a positive moment. Then suddenly we begin to understand in a deeper sense why it is necessary to differentiate between Abraham and his followers, why the founder, in spite of his humanness, must live in a different way, away from all others, for he is doing God's work on Earth.
II. The Loss
He is founding a religion and bringing it to the people. In other words, he is bringing that by which the ethical must ultimately be grounded to counteract the arbitrariness of an ethic based on social convention. In Works of Love we shall see how this is worked out. Here, in Fear and Trembling, we notice that the transformation that Abraham must undergo in order to overcome his natural self, to accept that his self-interest must coincide with the interest of the people-much like Plato's potential philosopher-ruler (Plato, Republic 347d)-necessarily entails the loss a human being must feel when separated from his community, from his family, from what he loves. Abraham was a human being chosen to do something almost superhuman-therefore the loss. though I became a human being, to have become in the shape of a horse, I would not be more heterogeneous from being a human being than I have become with this event; not that it is such a big difference to not have the same shape in common as is the difference not to have the same ideas, but to have them totally opposite on the most crucial points (Kierkegaard, Papirer X 4 A 357).
For S. Kierkegaard, at least, it is quite clear that Abraham now seems to be anything but human. He is unable to express all the requirements of human experience in the world, including the Christian requirement that he love his neighbour as himself, a kind of love that in S. Kierkegaard's interpretation, as we shall see a little later, comes to look quite different from any Christian understanding of this concept. But there can be no doubt that in Kierkegaard's understanding of the "existence-medium," the other is always already there requiring your attention-therefore Abraham's tragic but necessary loss.
In the essay "The Tragic Motif," a phenomenology of isolated and disintegrated modern singularity is presented in comparison with the belonging individual of the ancient Greek city-state following Sophocles' Antigone. It reads much like the description of Abraham's story after his act of "absolute responsibility," a kind of responsibility Derrida considers essentially inconceivable, unthinkable, because it "needs to be exceptional or extraordinary" (Derrida 61). Tragedy itself, Kierkegaard argues, gives voice to the question of being in the world. Its task is to make human beings recall that they are not isolated beings targeted by conniving gods (Snell 20) , but beings capable of freely creating their own future, good or bad, within a given horizon that posits possibility, a circumscribed possibility for sure, but a possibility nevertheless. Tragedy was (and is) a reminder that "even if the individual [Individ] moved freely, he nevertheless rested in substantial determinants [Bestemmelser] , in the state, the family, in fate" (Kierkegaard, Either 143; SV2, 133) .
The ancient Greek individual was understood and understood himself as a belonging creature connected to both finite and infinite backgrounds and not without tension. In such a society, the individual had a responsibility to the something "more" (det Mere) outside itself, the kind of responsibility understood in a general sense as the ethical, and hence not the kind of responsibility to which Abraham had committed himself when he began his journey up Mount Moriah. Abraham's responsibility "must therefore be [ethically] irresponsible in order to be absolutely responsible" to the god, as Derrida interprets (Derrida 61).
Considering the historical period of Abraham, and the absolute dependency of the individual on the way of the community as a whole in such days, when societies could all but disappear (by plague or warfare), the comparison I will make here will be appropriate, but possibly not stark enough. While Derrida speaks of "sacrifice," I prefer to think of such absolute responsibility as "loss" because Abraham was ethically responsible up until he was tested, or he presumably would not have been chosen. He had been given the task of founder before he was so severely tested, and thus the loss seems imposed and not really chosen, although there is room for disagreement on this point. In other words, I read it as a circumstance of before and after, not as an either-or proposition. consequently there has been a forgetting of the responsibility that in times past held communities together, a forgetting of the transcendental that maintained the invisible, the hidden from where responsibility flows. Instead we are confronted with the tragic and comic circumstances of pure subjectivity manifesting its accidentality over against totality (Kierkegaard, Either 142; SV2, 132) . If we were to apply this to Abraham's story, it would seem more like a choice of the divine over the human, as some would say, but perhaps it would make sense to call it the loss shouldered by
Abraham because of his role as founder. The Christian church also chose to deny its clerics a fundamental part of the "existence-medium," unlike Plato for whom the sensual could not be denied.
But the narrative continues. Under the circumspect conditions of this narrative, the concept of obligation has been bracketed. As Kierkegaard argues, "Our age is sufficiently depressed to know that there is something which is called responsibility and that this means something. Therefore, although everyone wants to rule, no one wants to have responsibility" (Kierkegaard, Either 142; SV2, 132) . That is to say, the responsibility that held the polis together has dissolved in both directions. Arendt would argue that the household realm has dramatically enlarged into what today PhaenEx we call society (Arendt, , making any political action aim at more or less private affairs rather than solving what ought to be strictly political or public problems, that is, problems citizens share. The notion of responsibility now sows tension in human experience rather than relationship. Now the dialogue is strictly internal, which certainly is true for Abraham; now subjectivity controls both positions and easily erases the nagging tension. Now freedom is not to choose within a set of given circumstances; now freedom is to do (frivolously): "I think, therefore I am," and therefore I can do-as I like. This latter dimension of modern existence, of which Kierkegaard speaks so scathingly, cannot be applied to Abraham. This was not part of a modus operantum known to him. But in this present age there are no gestures or gifts without expectation, no sense of obligation without reciprocity. The concept of the "other" is buried in the depth of the soul. Reason knows, but knowing and experience have been sharply differentiated in modernitythis is the stuff of guilt and anxiety. Egoism wins the battle, the "other" is forgotten-it is only absently present. The other in terms of the community is also absently present for Abraham but not forgotten. That is precisely the loss. Thus we can say that Abraham's life, after the event, has a "truly tragic" dimension inasmuch as there is a denial of his true nature as a belonging being.
For S. Kierkegaard, at least, it is quite clear that Abraham now seems to be anything but human. His silence could not translate into the external world, his silence had to remain within him always. He is unable to share his experience with his fellow beings who constitute the alienated background. He is unable to express all the requirements of human experience in the world including the Christian requirement that he love his neighbour as himself. But there can be no doubt that in
Kierkegaard's understanding of the "existence-medium," the other is always already there requiring your attention-this is Abraham's tragic but necessary loss.
III. Modern Subjectivity and Abraham
We can also turn to Two Ages and Works of Love, both of which were part of the later Kierkegaard continues in Two Ages with some comments about either being in contradiction with oneself or being in harmony with oneself, and these apply nicely if not absolutely to our thesis about Abraham. In terms of the principle of contradiction Kierkegaard insists that it constitutes an axiom of existence. "To suspend (haeve) the principle of contradiction is the existential expression for being in contradiction with oneself" (Kierkegaard, Ages 97; SV14, 88; translation amended). And to be in contradiction with oneself is to be separated from the conceptual framework that forms the essential distinction between good and evil in action and decision (Kierkegaard, Ages 66; SV14, 61).
To suspend this essential distinction is to be nothing at all. To put it in positive terms, it means that to be existentially, and hence to acknowledge the distinction, is to be in harmony with oneself, with whom one is. It is to be at home with oneself. But what exactly did Kierkegaard mean by being at home with the self?
The principle of contradiction strengthens the individual [Individ] in faithfulness to itself, so that he, like that steadfast number three Socrates speaks of so beautifully, will rather endure everything than become a number four or even become a very large even number. He will rather be something small in faithfulness to himself than all sorts of things in contradiction with himself (Kierkegaard, Ages 97; SV14, 89).
I want to question whether Abraham was ever in harmony with himself after the event on Mount
Moriah? Does he not suffer a sense of unheimlichkeit, to use Heidegger's terms? When S.
Kierkegaard speaks of being in harmony with oneself, he of course is referring to Plato's Phaedo (104c), but more importantly, he is also referring to the Gorgias (482c) where Socrates says to Callicles, in Hannah Arendt's rendition:
It would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with discourse, and that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict me (Arendt, Life 181).
Arendt maintains the emphasis on "being one," claiming that it is frequently left out in translation.
What is of particular interest in regard to this quotation is its relationship in the dialogue to philosophy's capacity to engender community as opposed to the efforts of rhetoric. As Socrates insists, "philosophy speaks always the same" (482b) while rhetoric, the language of the Sophists, caters to people's divergent interests, not to their needs, which are always the same. Thus Plato performs a double move inasmuch as Socrates' love of philosophy not only creates harmony in his soul but also in the city. As Arendt concludes elsewhere, this positive assertion of philosophical truth, which has an undeniable impact on practical conduct, is not entirely apolitical (Arendt, . For Kierkegaard, to always speak the same is to acknowledge the principle of contradiction with respect to its broadest implication. It means to be in character with oneself and to remain so, and hence to be faithful to oneself, that is, to act in accordance with one's daimon, what kept
Socrates from veering off the way of the λογος. Only by being in harmony with oneself is community possible. Can we then say that Abraham was in contradiction with himself inasmuch as his being in the "existence-medium," being in the community, could not be ethically expressed, could not be morally manifested?
To exist without responsibility generally speaking is for Kierkegaard to be superficial, and superficiality suspends the distinction between concealment and disclosedness. Inasmuch as "superficiality gives the appearance of being anything and everything," what is essential may not be thought through in concealment, and thoughtful intention is prevented from emerging. Everything is hurriedly forced to the surface, undeliberated, and what is disclosed is characterized by emptiness. It is an emptiness which, Kierkegaard says, "nevertheless extensively wins the disappointing advantage of delusion over essential disclosedness which has the homogeneous essentiality of deepening" (Kierkegaard, Ages 102; SV14, 93) . Rather than achieving transparency, this form of disclosedness only uncovers appearances. That is to say, psychologically, the single self is not tending to personal development in terms of its nature as spirit. Here we run into a paradox, and perhaps we are carrying this analogy of modern experience too far, for here we cannot say that Abraham is not attending to himself as spirit. But there is a sense in which he conceals his spiritedness-he may be the tax collector, we do not know. Thus not to be faithful to oneself or not to be in harmony with oneself expresses itself in a number of debilitating ways that are all grounded in the original suspension of the principle of contradiction. Whereas Kierkegaard sees the modern experience being caught up in a sharply differentiated externality, Abraham is caught up in a sharply differentiated inwardness that nevertheless also suspends the necessary principle of contradiction. To put it in less formal terms,
Abraham is unable to master the dialectic; he is in disharmony with himself precisely because his dialectic has lost its other dimension. His absolute responsibility indeed causes him to be completely irresponsible toward the ethical, and thus entirely irresponsible to himself as a human being.
Abraham has been isolated, not from the worldly, but precisely into the religious where we cannot follow him and where we cannot understand him. He cannot share his experience with the community, but neither can he make the leap into the religious for the community. 
IV. Kierkegaard's Singularity-the existence-medium
In Works of Love Kierkegaard puts Abraham's followers into the "existence-medium" in which they properly belong. The question is, can Abraham also be folded in? We shall see. In this "existence-medium" it becomes clear that the fullest kind of life presupposes that we must adhere to what a student of mine prefers to call "eternal love," as Kierkegaard himself now and then refers to Elsebet Jegstrup
Christian love, what I have elsewhere called "love as obligation" (Jegstrup, "Text" concealed. Her pain renders her isolated, and she becomes as homeless as Sophocles' Antigone who also was "never at home with the living nor with the dead" (Kierkegaard, Either 159; SV2, 147) . Her pain is in both cases her outward denial of "the more" that cannot be denied, her denial of externality. She is overcome by guilt and lacks all transparency as she decides to live and die with her secret as does Abraham, and that is "truly tragic." One could argue that S. Kierkegaard's concept of singularity proper as expressed in Works of Love will seem to have the characteristics of the tragic hero yet rely on a particular kind of inwardness that will be manifested in a very different way than is the case for Kierkegaard's Antigone and Abraham.
It is not well known that Kierkegaard dabbled in what Arendt would call "the political." In
Works of Love he not only restored the human condition, he also explored that context in all its dimensions, including "the political" (Jegstrup "Justice"). In other words, the idea of singularity Kierkegaard developed in Works of Love could easily be called Kierkegaard's "political being." It is this prototype he refers to in the Danish as den Enkelte. But den Enkelte, or singularity, in this case implies a responsibility that has particular characteristics that are developed from Matthew's dictum:
"You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Matthew 22:39). Kierkegaard rewrites this dictum to read: "You shall love the neighbour as yourself." He quickly identifies the neighbour as the other (den Anden), as the next person you see, as all humankind (Kierkegaard, Love 19; SV12, 25) . The aim is community and that is singularity's "existence-medium." That, necessarily, is a political concept as Aristotle would insist. Interestingly, Kierkegaard understands this human condition much like Aristotle for whom "he who is without a city is either a god or a beast" (Aristotle 1253a3). The argument is that community is possible for us because we have reason and language, two characteristics enabling a determination of advantage and disadvantage. Without community we are not fully human. In Works of Love, we get the same message from Kierkegaard. Ontologically, he argues, we are belonging beings:
In the busy, teeming crowd, which as companionship is both too much and too little, a person grows weary of society; but the cure is not to make the discovery that God's thought was wrong-no, the cure is simply to learn all over again that first thought, to be conscious of longing for community . . . So deeply is this need rooted in human nature, and so essentially does it belong to being human (Kierkegaard, SV12, 150; translation amended) . This is precisely where S. Kierkegaard begins his argument by obligating us to love the other as we love ourselves. It is in the how love is expressed, it is in how singularity comports itself that the gifts of love may become visible, not to sense perception but to the mind's eye, not as cognition but as νοησις, if we may borrow from Plato. If this is correct, then Works of Love is not a theory of love or even a theory of the works of love, and that would mean it is not an ethic. It is, rather, a deconstructive phenomenology of singularity's being-in-the-world as love, a love that has a vertical direction but whose horizontal connection to existence, we are told, is unfathomable [uudgrundelig] (Jegstrup, New 81; emphasis added).
Kierkegaard addresses the question of love by contrasting eternal love and poetic love. The latter lacks stability, it lacks constancy, it lacks an all-encompassing capacity. It is uncontrollable and unreliable and needs constant testing, and it can turn into something else, into hate or jealousy. But its worst characteristic, from Kierkegaard's perspective in Works of Love, is that it is preferential and thus exclusive. It can only love one person "above all others"-at a time! Eternal love, in contrast, "loves the whole human race, all people, even the enemy" (Kierkegaard, Love 19; SV12, 25) , and hence is all inclusive. One could say it presupposes community. It is a kind of love we have control over; it constitutes comportment; it is the way singularity meets the world; it is something of which we can take charge, while falling in love is an event that happens to us. Eternal love has constancy, is entirely reliable, and it purposely reaches out. "Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence, eternally and happily secured against despair" (Kierkegaard, Love 29; SV12, 34) .
The how of its love is to presuppose love in the other, and to presuppose love in the other is to build up the self. "This 'up' in 'build up' indicates height, but it indicates height inversely as depth" (Kierkegaard, Love 211; SV12, , ranking life qualitatively inasmuch as it is singularity that is built up by presupposing love in the other. Importantly for S. Kierkegaard's understanding of eternal love, it is not about transforming the other; rather it is about letting the other be, thereby transforming oneself (Kierkegaard, Love 21, 217; SV12, 27, 210) . Poetic love makes demands of the other, attempts to change the other, something the self would not like, whereas eternal love makes no demands, does not try to change the other, does not try to reduce the other to the same (Kierkegaard, Love 21; SV12, 27) . Eternal love lets the other be. To love the other as the self is therefore to love the other in the way the self would wish to be loved. To love the other is to let the other be.
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Love as obligation is structural; it is directed both vertically as well as horizontally. The religious is the responsibility of the subject to the wholly other (tout autre)-a general structure of experience-an obligation without ethics, as Caputo interprets Abraham's act on Mount Moriah (Caputo 206) . This is also how every other subject loves. The only difference is that this general structure of experience expresses itself horizontally, not in terms of Abraham's loss, but in terms of relating to every other. The gift of love is not to see difference, but to experience equality through difference, to close one's eyes and just love-that is to say, to love the other regardless of difference, regardless of disagreement, regardless of circumstances (Kierkegaard, Love 118; SV12, 118) . Thus love is a gift that needs to be given. Derrida often asked whether there was such a thing as a gift since it seemed to be always attached to expectation or reciprocity. I would like to ask whether it is a gift if it is not given? Kierkegaard seems to want to answer in the negative to this question (Kierkegaard, Love 67; SV12, 70) . Love, to be love, must express itself. If it is not given, is there love? Kierkegaard reduces poetic love to self-love-something with which I think we all, ultimately, must agree. Eternal love is also grounded in the self, as we have seen, but expresses itself necessarily to an other. Thus eternal love must operate with closed eyes. The gift of love is the kind of love that "wants the dissimilarity to hang loosely on singularity, as loosely as the cape the king casts off in order to show who he is . . . When the dissimilarity hangs loosely in this way, then in singularity there continually glimmers that essential other, which is common to all" (Kierkegaard, Love 88; SV12, 90) . The other is always already before singularity, and singularity's responsibility grows out of that condition. But why should he love that other? This is where the persona of Abraham that was drawn by Johannes de silentio in Fear and Trembling truly stands out as a "reckless anticipation,"
for here in Works of Love, here where singularity is properly located in the "existence-medium," here we come to understand what it really means to love God.
We are still talking about an act of faith and hence about a leap that looms as virtually impossible from any perspective. In both cases we are talking about absolute obedience, however, the content of the obedience differs. In the case of Abraham, the command from on high deprives
Abraham of the dialectic of existence proper, whereas in the case of Works of Love and S.
Kierkegaard's reading of Matthew's dictum, the act of obedience maintains and is directed toward human experience in its truest sense-it maintains the relational dimension that according to S.
Kierkegaard is ontologically given, making singularity a belonging being and hence responsible to the other. Here the meaning of faith is essentially this: "in love for the neighbor, God is the middle term. Love God above all else; then you also love the neighbor and in the neighbor every human being. Only by loving God above all else can one love the neighbor in the other human being"
(Kierkegard, Love 58; SV12, 62). "Christian love is sheer action" (Kierkegard, Love 99; SV12, 100), he argues, sounding a little like Levinas speaking of "performativity." To love in this way is not a cognitive act, but rather it is about doing, about a way of being in the world-for the other (Kierkegaard, Love 223; SV12, 216) . This is different from the absolute obedience required of Abraham and which takes him away from the world. But S. Kierkegaard, like Johannes de silentio, is still talking about absolute obedience, except that now the requirement entails something different;
now it is about singularity's ethical task for life (Kierkegaard, Love 118; SV12, 117)-and there are no rewards, the reader is warned, in this argument against utilitarianism. Acquiring such clarity of oneself, of the freedom of possibility of singularity as such, these are singular moments of identity really mean to love God?" is presented with so much detail, so much historical context, and where the responsibility of being a belonging being is so strongly emphasized in a true existence-medium?
Is this not closer to the true meaning of faith as love in Kierkegaard' s works than what we find in
Fear and Trembling? Abraham suffered his loss, we must speculate, precisely because he was the only one, the chosen one, and that was his tragedy, but it is not the tragedy of his followers-at least not in the eyes of one S. Kierkegaard.
Notes

